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Arbitrators are the lightning rod for investment arbitration’s most contentious
political debates. Investment arbitration was originally conceived as a means to
depoliticize international investment law. The regime was designed to extricate
investment disputes from national courts and gunboat diplomacy, entrusting them
instead to a neutral law-bound process.1 According to its critics, however, investment
arbitration is neither neutral, nor a legitimate law-bound process.2 They lay most of the
blame with international arbitrators.
Critics contend that, instead of law and appropriate policy considerations, investment
arbitrators’ decisions are often the product of extra-legal factors—from their own
ideology, to the nature of disputants, to their personal self-interest.3 For every hypothesis
about what extra-legal factors affect investment arbitrators’ decisions, there seems to be
an equal and opposite hypothesis.
Critics hypothesize that investment arbitrators favor their appointing party in a selfinterested effort to increase the likelihood of future appointments;4 defenders counter

1.

2.

3.

4.
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See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-state
Arbitral Awards: The Re-politicization of International Investment Disputes, 21 AM. REV. INT’L
ARB. 211(2010) (purpose of investment arbitration is to depoliticize investment disputes); Ibrahim
Shihata, Towards a Greater Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and
MIGA, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING WORLD 102-03 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R.
Parra eds., 1st ed. 1991).
These critiques are summarized in a highly publicized statement drafted by approximately fifty
academics from various jurisdictions. Gus Van Harten et al., Public Statement, PUBLIC
STATEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT REGIME 1 (Aug. 31, 2010), available at http://
http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/publicstatement/documents/Public%20Statement%20%28June%202011%29.pdf (expressing concern
that investment arbitration has harmed the public welfare, particularly by “hampering . . . the
ability of governments to act for their people in response to the concerns of human development
and environmental sustainability”). One sign of the collective effect of these criticisms is that it is
now commonplace to speak of a “backlash against” and “legitimacy crisis in” investment
arbitration. See generally THE BACKLASH AGAINST INVESTMENT ARBITRATION (Michael Waibel, et
al. eds., 2010); Susan D. Franck, The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration:
Privatizing Public International Law Through Inconsistent Decisions, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1521
(2005); Asha Kaushal, Revisiting History: How the Past Matters for the Present Backlash Against
the Foreign Investment Regime, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 491 (2009).
In this article, I use the term “extra-legal” to refer to a host of factors that are apart from legal
texts, precedents and procedures. These include “ideology, judicial background, strategic reaction
to other institutions, the nature of litigants, or the makeup of [tribunals].” Gregory C. Sisk, The
Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision Making,
93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 877 (2008); M. Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in
International Law, 10 SINGAPORE YB INT’L L. 19, 30-31 nn.40-43 (2006) (referring to an
“arbitration fraternity” that promotes its own interests at the expense of legitimate state
interests). In addition to scholarly commentary, several advocacy groups have advanced this
position. See, e.g., Pia Eberhardt & Cecilia Olivet, Profiting from injustice: how law firms,
arbitrators and financiers are fueling an investment arbitration boom, CORPORATE EUROPE
OBSERVATORY (Nov. 12, 2012), http://corporateeurope.org/sites/default/files/publications/profitingfrom-injustice.pdf.
The propriety and potential effects of such “favoritism” is taken up infra notes 55-63, and
accompanying text.
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that arbitrators’ strongest self-interest is in developing reputations for impartiality. 5
Critics challenge arbitration rules that prohibit arbitrators from sharing nationality with
the parties because they preclude States from appointing culturally sympathetic
arbitrators; 6 defenders call these same rules a “step in the right direction.” 7 Critics
complain that investment arbitrators are a closed “club,”8 while defenders claim such
critiques are exaggerated. 9 Critics argue that arbitrators are inclined to render
compromise awards so that neither party is dissatisfied; 10 defenders counter that
balancing methodologies are “perhaps something quite different than arbitrators
traditionally conceived.”11
Perhaps the most damning hypothesis is that investment arbitrators systematically
value investor interests over State interests, either to increase their own business
opportunities12 or because of their policy preferences favor investor claims over State
interests.13 Defenders respond, quite vehemently, that partisan decision-making would

5.
6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 492 (2009).
William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times:
The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment
Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2007) (identifying as a weakness in investment arbitration
tribunals the inability under ICSID rules of States to appoint their own nationals to ensure that
arbitrators have sufficient understanding and sympathy for the context of States’ decision
making).
Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV. 339 (2010)
(arguing that rules that preclude appointing of an arbitrator who shares the nationality of one
party as “a step in the right direction”).
David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Arbitration: Seeking an Explanation for
Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383 (2010).
Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86 N.C. L.
REV. 1, 77-78 (2007).
Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 34 (2008) (arguing that since “arbitrators are commonly chosen (directly or indirectly) and
paid by the parties, giving the arbitrators an interest in rendering decisions that will
maximize the chances that they will be chosen again in future disputes. The result is an
incentive to render compromised judgments that do not badly offend either party.”) (cited in
Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns of Elite
Investment Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 49 n.4 (2010)).
Alec Stone Sweet, Arbitration and Judicialization, 1(9) OÑATI SOCIO-LEGAL SERIES, at 75 (Jan.
20, 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988923.
Cf. Andrew Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE
L.J. 1279, 1282 (2000) (hypothesizing that in domestic arbitration, by ignoring applicable
mandatory rules, arbitrators can “develop a reputation as a desirable arbitrator” and thus
increase their chances at future selection).
This concern is echoed by many scholars. See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in
Investment Treaty Interpretation: The Dual Role of States¸ 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 179, 207 n.134 (2010)
(noting that many investment arbitrators “have a background primarily in international
commercial arbitration rather than public international law” and that background “may make
[them] less familiar with or concerned about public international law interpretive approaches”);
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty
Arbitration, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INVESTMENT DISPUTES 39, 41-42 (Karl P. Sauvant ed.,
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be counterproductive14 if not “suicidal”15 for arbitrators. The allegations of systemic bias
have, however, refused to be dispelled by these and related responses.
Most of these hypotheses and counter-hypotheses are based on anecdotal accounts of
the system or more general dissatisfaction with, or support for, the substantive policy
outcomes of particular cases. However, each hypothesis is predicated on certain oftenunarticulated empirical assumptions. These empirical assumptions have remained
untested and largely been taken for granted. Recently, an increasing number of scholars
have begun testing these various empirical assumptions.
This new research has drawn inspiration from the extensive body of existing empirical
literature on domestic and international judges,16 and (to a lesser extent) domestic U.S.
arbitrators.17 The ostensible purpose of both bodies of research is to evaluate objectively
various hypotheses about the potential influence of extra-legal factors in adjudicatory
decision-making. Despite the similarities, there are important respects in which the two
seemingly similar sets of inquiries differ.
Many distinctive features of investment arbitration affect the nature of empirical
inquires. On the one hand, the study of investment arbitrators presents unique
methodological challenges. Investment arbitration is a relatively new, rapidly expanding
and evolving, and politically charged environment.18 Investment arbitration awards and
related documentation are not systematically available. As a result of these features,
data about investment arbitrators is more limited and fragmented than the most-often
vast data sets that are relied on for research regarding either domestic judicial decisionmaking or international judicial decision-making.19
Another important distinction between research on investment arbitrators and similar
research on judges is the potential effect of such research on the object of study. Judicial
decision-making exists within relatively stable governmentally established institutions.

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
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2008) (arguing that the fact that because most arbitrators come from commercial arbitration
backgrounds, they may not be as sensitive to the public nature of the interests involved); David
Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an
Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, 30 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383, 411-12 (2010).
Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 492 (2008-09).
Sweet, supra note 11, at 21 (“[I]t seems suicidal for arbitrators to proceed . . . with a heavy thumb
pressed permanently down on the investors’ side in cases with very high political stakes.”).
See infra notes 24–80, and accompanying text.
See infra notes 24–80, and accompanying text.
Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53 HARV. INT’L L. J.
391, 393 (2012) (noting the explosion in the caseload and the fact that cases are require “complex
and politically fraught value-balancing exercises”).
The International Court of Justice also has a very limited set of cases to study. In total, it has only
“heard 124 contentious cases and has considered twenty-six requests for advisory opinions in its
sixty-five-year history, resulting in an annual filing rate of slightly more than two cases—
contentious or advisory—per year.” Born, infra note 136, at 805 (footnote omitted). Unlike
investment arbitral awards, however, all judgments are public.
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Empiricists approach judicial decision-making as an existing phenomenon, knowing it is
largely structurally impervious to critiques by outside scholars. By contrast, empirical
researchers studying the decision-making of investment arbitrators must have a degree
of specialized knowledge in the field. Not surprisingly, therefore, scholars conducting
empirical research in investment arbitration are rarely passive scholarly observers, but
instead often have specific connections to particular actors within, or viewpoints about,
the field.20 Relatedly, researchers in investment arbitration often propose specific reforms
to the field tied to their research findings.21 The stakes for empirical research about
investment arbitration, in other words, are high because it specifically aims at and has
the potential to promote specific reforms.
This paper examines the state of empirical research about investment arbitrators and
related reform proposals. My aim is not to weigh in on specific proposed reforms, but
instead to evaluate the potential for empirical research to contribute to development of a
more comprehensive understanding of international adjudication. Through the lens of
specific reform proposals that draw from empirical studies in the field, this Article
analyzes the limitations and potential contributions of empirical research to the
development of investment arbitration. This analysis suggests that purportedly neutral
empirical inquiries about the potential bias of investment arbitrators may themselves at
times be colored by particular policy preferences. The solution, I propose, is to situate and
supplement empirical research about investment arbitration with qualitative research
and comparative institutional analysis regarding other international tribunals. This
approach will help control for the policy interests that can affect empirical inquiries
about investment arbitrators. It will also help research about investment arbitration
contribute to development of a comprehensive theory of international adjudication.
Part I of this paper begins with a brief sketch of some of the most significant
methodological challenges raised generally by empirical research into adjudicatory
decisionmaking. It also addresses more specifically how some of those methodological
challenges affect empirical research regarding investment arbitrators. The assessment of
empirical methodology provides a backdrop to the analysis of issues in the remainder of
the paper.
Part II offers an evaluation of selected reforms that have been proposed for
20.

21.

It might be interesting to study empirically the profiles of those engaged in empirical research
regarding investment arbitration. I would hypothesize that such research would reveal two major
trends among the most prominent researchers—either some direct professional experience
working in the field (in a firm, as an arbitrator or as a clerk for arbitrator) or active involvement in
an international NGO that works on international investment law issues. I am not suggesting
that these backgrounds in themselves undermine the credibility of researchers or are perfectly
predictive of their views on investment arbitration. I do suggest, however, that they might provide
an interesting contrast with the profiles of U.S. scholars who have studied judicial decisionmaking from a more detached position.
Two such proposed reforms are the subject of this article. See infra Part II.

229

12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (2013)

investment arbitration based, in part, on some findings in empirical research. In Section
A, I examine Albert van den Berg’s study of dissenting opinions by party-appointed
arbitrators and related proposals to dramatically reduce if not eliminate dissenting
opinions.22 Section B examines Gus Van Harten’s study of jurisdictional rulings, and
related proposal for a permanent International Investment Court.23 I use both studies to
examine some of the methodological challenges identified in Part I, and to illustrate the
risks of linking empirical research to specific reform proposals. Part II also analyzes, in
comparison with other adjudicatory models, some questions about system design in
investment arbitration that are raised by the two studies.
Based on the findings in Part II, Part III argues for integration of research about
investment arbitration into a comprehensive theory of international adjudication. Public
international adjudication, including investment arbitration, aims at the neutral
imposition of legal limitations on the exercise of State power. While they are sometimes
compared, they are rarely analyzed together in empirical research.
Part III argues for the broadening of empirical research regarding investment
arbitrators to consider other features of system design. It nevertheless calls for caution in
giving excessive weight to or predicating proposed reforms on limited findings. To that
end, it argues that quantitative empirical findings should be cross-tested through
comparative analysis with other international tribunals, and in the context of greater
dialogue with other forms of qualitative scholarship.

I. Empirical Research Regarding Investment Arbitrators
Empirical research on adjudicatory decision-making by both judges and arbitrators
has become a genre of its own, even within the larger body of empirical legal studies24
and specifically empirical research in international legal scholarship. 25 This trend is

22.
23.

24.

25.
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Albert van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment
Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W.
MICHAEL REISMAN 824 (Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010).
Although Van Harten’s empirical research supports his call for an international investment court,
it came much later than his original calls for the court. GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 180-84 (2007); Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International
Investment Court, Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law (SIEL) Inaugural Conference 2008, Paper No. 22/08
(2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153424.
Tracey E. George, An Empirical Study of Empirical Legal Scholarship: The Top Law Schools, 81
IND. L.J. 141 (2006); Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical Legal
Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1713 (2011). Jason Yackee explores in
his contribution to this volume a thoughtful, and related, assessment of the need for greater
cooperation between legal scholars and social scientists in designing empirical research. See Jason
Webb Yackee, Do States Bargain over Investor-State Dispute Settlement? Or, Toward Greater
Collaboration in the Study of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 12 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L 277 (2013).
See Gregory Shaffer & Tom Ginsburg, The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship,
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (2012) (“[A] new generation of empirical studies is elaborating on how
international law works in different contexts.”); Beth A. Simmons & Andrew B. Breidenbach,

The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators

evident not only from the sheer volume of published papers, but also the fact that there
are now even entire symposia dedicated to the topic.26 This Part examines in Section A
the goals of such research, both with respect to domestic and international judges and
also with respect to investment arbitrators. In Section B, I survey some of the most
significant methodological challenges in all empirical studies of adjudicatory decisionmaking, and the unique ways that these challenges are manifest in the study of
investment arbitrators.

A. Goals and Effects of Empirical Research
Empirical research regarding investment arbitrators derives both inspiration and
methodological approaches from empirical research into judicial decision-making. But
there are also important differences, both in terms of specific goals and in its impact.
This Section examines those differences and their potential implications for empirical
research about investment arbitrators.
1.

The Draw to Empirics

In the context of national judicial decision-making, two schools of thought have
inspired the growing body of empirical research. The first is the anti-formalist critique of
legal decision-making. 27 The conventional, formalist view of adjudicatory decisionmaking is that outcomes depend on an almost mechanical application of law to the facts
of the case. This view still has significant purchase in certain circles, particularly in civil
law systems.28 In U.S. academic and professional communities, legal realists, and later
critical legal scholars, have challenged this view of judicial decision-making. They posit
that other factors, most notably personal policy preferences of judges, determine
outcomes.29 Scholars have pursued empirical research to prove that the realists had the
better view and that formalism was an obsolete model for understanding legal decisionmaking.30

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

The Empirical Turn in International Economic Research, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 198, 200 (2011)
(“In the specific area of international economic law, the trend is less noted, but is on the
rise.”).
See, e.g., Steven G. Gey & Jim Rossi, Empirical Measures of Judicial Performance: An
Introduction to the Symposium, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1001 (2005).
See Harry T. Edwards & Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decision-making, 58 DUKE L.J. 1895, 1924 (2009).
Michael Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political? (2012), http://www.wipol.unibonn.de/lehrveranstaltungen-1/lawecon-workshop/archive/dateien/waibelwinter11-12, at 32 (cited
with permission).
This approach is sometimes characterized as an “attitudinal model” of judicial decision-making.
See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
65 (1993).
Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1913 (arguing that “[r]ecent empirical studies . . . [rely on
a] premise . . . that either law determines case outcomes, or judicial decision-making is

231

12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (2013)

A second beacon for empiricists, which follows from the first, is concerns about
systemic bias. If factors other than neutral application of law to facts affect case
outcomes, systems of justice that are presumed to be law-bound and impartial could,
instead, be systematically biased in favor of certain parties or outcomes.31 The effort to
identify the factors that contribute to systemic bias, and to measure the extent to which
that supposed bias affects outcomes, has lured even more empiricists to the field. 32
Together these two postulates have generated an extensive body of research. The
ostensibly neutral yardstick of empirics seems like a perfect tool to evaluate the supposed
bias of adjudicatory decision-makers.
2.

Empirical Research in Investment Arbitration

While empirical scholars have long focused on judges, they only recently trained their
focus on investment arbitrators. One important reason is that investment arbitration
itself is relatively new, and, consequently, a significant body of publicly available data
has only recently become available.33 Some of the same questions that inspire research
into judicial decision-making have also inspired empirical research into investment
arbitrators’ decision-making. There are, however, some important differences.
In the judicial context, research agendas are generally framed by theoretical
orientations, such as anti-formalism or social-choice theory.34 Similar research regarding
investment arbitrators, by contrast, is often inspired by, and necessarily feeds into, a
much more particularized and driven debate about the legitimacy of investment
arbitration. 35 Empirical research about judicial decision-making may affect academic
discussion, but so far no significant procedural or constitutional reforms have been
proposed based on that research. By contrast, empirical research about investment

31.
32.
33.

34.
35.
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impermissibly dominated by ideology and politics”).
One of the most prominent works in this vein is CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006).
See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 190.
Information about international commercial arbitration is generally much less available. In
response to critics and political pressure, investment arbitration has made significant steps to
become more transparent. As a result, the body of publicly available information about investment
arbitration has grown exponentially in recent years. See Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in
International Commercial Arbitration, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1301 (2006).
See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1915-16.
See Susan D. Franck, Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty Arbitration, 86
N.C. L. REV. 1, 13-23 (2007). A similar divide exists in domestic U.S. arbitration, where advocates
for consumer and employee rights in particular regard what has been dubbed “mandatory
arbitration” as depriving those claimants of important procedural rights they would have in U.S.
courts. This divide has produced a vibrant political debate, and some substantial proposals for
structural reform. Empirical research is now playing an increasingly important role in sorting out
the nature and true extent of perceived problems with existing practices. See Peter B. Rutledge,
Arbitration Reform: What We Know and What We Need to Know, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL.
579 (2009).
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arbitration has a much broader audience that extends well beyond the academic
community. 36 Research often expressly aims at particular factions within this larger
audience, not all of whom are sophisticated consumers of empirical findings, seeking to
bolster (or stave off) particular proposals for reform.
What is currently referred to as a “legitimacy crisis” in investment arbitration is
driven in part by anecdotal impressions, which are sometimes sensationalized and
sometimes naively optimistic. Empirical data could, at least theoretically, provide a
firmer basis for systematically evaluating the functioning of investment arbitration.37
But the highly politicized nature of the field also creates some risks for how empirical
research may be used, or misused.38 While “empirical studies [can] provide facts on which
to base legal doctrine and public policy,”39 there is also “a danger that policy makers will
take up a study for purposes that the research does not support.”40
The allure of the ostensible neutrality of empirical research should not overtake
critical assessments of its value in light of the limitations of both particular empirical
studies and empirical research as a methodology for measuring phenomenon as complex
as legal decision-making. As valuable and important as empirical research can be, it
must be read, interpreted, and relied on only with a full understanding of its limitations.

B. Methodological Challenges
Critiques of empirical research into judicial behavior are by now almost as extensive
as the original empirical research itself. Systematic reflection has led to some sober
assessment about the methodological limitations of such research, as well as the limited
implications of its outcomes. At a more structural level, scholars generally acknowledge
that definitively proving or disproving systemic bias in adjudication is, quite simply,
impossible. 41 That impossibility is inherent in empirical methodology, and in the
peculiarities of legal decision-making.
This Part briefly reviews some of the most significant limitations with regard to

36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.

Empirical critiques of investment arbitration appear to have informed, for example, UNCTAD’s
recent publication, Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a Roadmap, available
at http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaepcb2013d4_en.pdf.
Simmons & Breidenbach, supra note 25, at 214 (“First and foremost, empirical studies give
researchers the ability to systematically evaluate legal institutions in light of their goals.”).
Gus Van Harten, Fairness and Independence in Investment Arbitration: A Critique of Susan
Franck’s “Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, SOCIAL SCIENCE
RESEARCH NETWORK 1-2 (Dec. 1, 2011), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1740031 (challenging empirical
findings in another study as “inappropriate” in its conclusions that investment arbitration “as a
whole, functions fairly” and is not in need of eradication or radical overhaul”).
Simmons & Breidenbach, supra note 25, at 216.
Van Harten, supra note 38, at 9 (objecting to the use of empirical research in support of policy
positions regarding the U.S. Model BIT).
Van Harten’s calls for reform are premised on risk and perception of bias as he acknowledges the
impossibility of proving actual bias. See, e.g., Van Harten, supra note 38, at 5.
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empirical study of judicial and arbitrator decision-making. A systematic survey of
empirical methodology is beyond the scope of this article, but this brief perusal of some of
the most significant limitations is helpful as a primer for understanding the growing
body of empirical research in the area of investment arbitration and its relationship to
proposed reforms. The point of this analysis is not to discourage empirical research, or to
discount the contributions it can make to our understanding of this emerging field. It is
instead an effort to rein in potentially exaggerated importance that may be attributed to
specific findings, which at best only provide partial and provisional insights into the
phenomena they study.
1.

The Elusive Control of the Most Essential Variable

One of the most fundamental difficulties with empirical research regarding legal
decision-making is that it seeks (often only implicitly) to measure whether and to what
extent extra-legal factors have affected the outcome of adjudicatory decisions. It cannot,
however, isolate what legal outcome would otherwise have resulted in the absence of any
hypothesized influences. In other words, it is impossible to control for the most essential
variable (implicitly or explicitly) being tested—the “correct” legal outcome in a particular
case.
Absent control for the correct outcome, or at least the relative strength of a particular
party’s case, the extent and even existence of deviations from it cannot be known for
certain. Some methodological workarounds have been developed in an attempt to control
for the strength of a case and the proper outcome.42 These workarounds provide proxies
for the correct substantive outcome, which have in turn helped sharpen empirical
inquiries.
One example of a workaround is in Gus Van Harten’s recent work, which uses a
content-based analysis to compare outcomes regarding jurisdiction as either more
“restrictive” or “expansive.”43 To avoid comparison with the “correct outcome” he engages
in a relative comparative analysis based on content analysis as between outcomes. He
finds that arbitrators tend more often to adopt expansive interpretations on issues of
jurisdiction, and reasons that such expansive findings tend to favor claimants because
they “expand[] the authority of investment treaty tribunals and . . . allow[]more claims to
proceed.” 44 Although Van Harten demonstrates a statistically significant propensity of

42.

43.
44.
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Notably, Waibel and Wu signal that their future research will seek to control for the relative
strength of jurisdictional challenges by having those challenges assessed by a panel of reputable
investment arbitration specialists. See Waibel & Wu, supra note 28, at 32. See also Van Harten,
supra note 38, at 214.
Gus Van Harten, Arbitrator Behaviour in Asymmetrical Adjudication: An Empirical Study of
Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 211, 226 (2012).
Gus Van Harten, Pro-Investor or Pro-State Bias in Investment-Treaty Arbitration?
Forthcoming Study Gives Cause for Concern, INT’L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEVEL., (Apr. 13, 2012),
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investment arbitrators to adopt expansive interpretations, all we know is that these
decisions are “more expansive” than other alternatives.
These outcomes appear to be more expansive than those preferred by individuals
whose policy preferences are for narrower investment arbitration jurisdiction. They do
not, however, represent a finding that investment arbitrators’ “expansive” jurisdictional
findings are somehow an improper deviation from the “correct” legal outcome. In fact,
Van Harten is careful not to characterize these findings as deviating from a correct legal
outcome,45 but he does offer a hypothesis about a possible motivation for the expansive
jurisdictional findings—that “a strong tendency toward expansive resolutions [on
jurisdictional issues] enhanced the compensatory promise of the system for
claimants[.]”46 Despite the “strong tendency” in his data and how well it fits with existing
narratives about arbitrator bias, Van Harten acknowledges that other hypotheses might
explain the result. At least one possible alternative hypothesis is explored in greater
detail below.47
2.

Correlation and Causation

In addition to an inability to control for correct outcomes, another important challenge
for empirical research regarding adjudicatory decision-making is that researchers are
hypothesizing about causal relationships, but empirical data can only prove correlation.
Specifically, researchers design studies to test for the influence of particular extra-legal
factors on legal decision-making and hypothesize which variables might be responsible
for that influence. In analyzing the data, researchers often find a correlation between the
variables that they have designed to test for. The problem is that observed correlations
do not prove causation. Some examples will help illustrate.
In one well-publicized study outside the field of adjudication, researchers found a
strong correlation between childhood myopia and infants who slept with the light on.48
The correlation was—reasonably, but wrongly—reported as proof that sleeping with the
light on as an infant caused myopia. A later study found no correlation between lighting
and myopia, but instead found a strong correlation between parental myopia and the
development of child myopia.49 Researchers in the second study made a related inference

45.

46.
47.
48.
49.

http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/04/13/pro-investor-or-pro-state-bias-in-investment-treatyarbitration-forthcoming-study-gives-cause-for-concern/#_ftn10 (last visited Oct. 27, 2013).
For example, he states, “If states expected the relevant issues to be resolved restrictively, this has
clearly not been the case in practice.” Van Harten, supra note 44, at 239. Of course,
interpretations that differ from what States expected are not the same thing as an improper
interpretation of “ambiguous language in investment treaties.” Van Harten, supra note 44, at 249.
Van Harten, supra note 44, at 214.
See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
Graham E. Quinn et al., Myopia and Ambient Lighting at Night, NATURE, May 15, 1999, at 113.
Holly Wagner, Night Lights Don't Lead To Nearsightedness, THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
RESEARCH NEWS, http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/nitelite.htm (last updated Mar. 3, 2000).
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(to provide an alternative hypothesis for the correlation identified in the earlier study)
that myopic parents were more likely to leave a light on in their children’s bedroom.50
Myopia, it seems, also interfered with the first researchers’ ability to distinguish
correlation from causation.51
Closer to the topic at hand, in the U.S. domestic arbitration context, some striking
correlations have led commentators to hypothesize about the existence of causal
relationships. For example, some scholars have observed that business claimants have
exceptionally high win rates (in excess of over ninety percent!) in consumer debt
arbitrations.52 Based on the observed correlation in this data, scholars, policymakers, and
commentators concluded that consumer debt arbitration was biased or “heavily slanted”
in favor of business parties.53 As it turns out, however, creditors had “even higher win
rates (raging form 98.4 percent to 100 percent)” in debt collection cases in national
courts.54 Bias in the arbitration process, in other words, does not appear to have been the
cause of high win rates for companies, or at least the strong correlation does not in itself
prove that it was.
Another criticism of consumer debt collection arbitration, which echoes some
complaints about investment arbitration, is that repeat-players enjoy beneficial
treatment by arbitrators who are anxious to be reappointed and therefore seek to render

50.
51.

52.

53.

54.
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See id.
See id. Another amusingly optimistic assumption of causation based on a finding of mere
correlation is the assertion that frequent sex makes men and women look at least seven years
younger. Claire Carter, Sex Is the Secret to Looking Younger, Claims Researcher, THE
TELEGRAPH (July 5, 2013, 7:30 AM), www.telegraph.co.uk/lifestyle/10161279/Sex-is-the-secretto-looking-younger-claims-researcher.html. It is at least possible that men and women who
look younger are better able and more inclined to attract more sexual partners than those who
look much older than them. It is equally plausible, however, that people who are interested in
having frequent sex are more attentive to their appearance and hence cultivating a younger
look.
See also Letter from Professors of Consumer Law and Banking Law to Senators Dodd and
Shelby and Congressmen Frank and Bachus, Statement in Support of Legislation Creating a
Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Sept. 29, 2009) (on file with Hofstra University School
of Law) (“Studies have found the arbitrators find for companies against consumers 94 to 96%
of the time, suggesting that arbitration providers are responding to the incentive to find for
those who select them: the companies that insert their names in their form contracts.”) (citing
John O’Donnell et al., The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers,
PUBLIC CITIZEN (Sept. 2007), http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?ID=7545; Simone
Baribeau, Consumer Advocates Slam Credit-Card Arbitration, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
(July 16, 2007), http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0716/p13s01-wmgn.html).
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, Creditor Claims in Arbitration and in Court, 7
HASINTGS BUS. L.J. 77, 79 (2010) (citing Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card Industry
Using It to Quash Legal Claims?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial and
Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 148 (2009) (testimony of David
Arkush stating that in success rates and award amounts, AAA arbitrations appear to be heavily
slanted in favor of businesses)).
Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy, __ Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION __ (forthcoming)
(manuscript at 6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101371.
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outcomes favorable to those most likely to reappoint them. This hypothesis seems
compelling both because of its inherent logic55 and because of its support from anecdotal
evidence.56 It also seems consistent with observed statistics indicating an exceptionally
high correlation between corporate parties and favorable outcomes cited above.
Here, empirical research did find a modest statistical correlation between repeatplayers and win rates (though no correlation with respect to percentage of recovery).57
This correlation was consistent with the hypothesis of arbitrator bias. Researchers also
found, however, that repeat businesses are more likely to settle or otherwise dispose of
unmeritorious cases before an award than non-repeat businesses.58 The screening out of
cases would increase win rates and, the study concluded, was more likely to have
produced a repeat-player effect than improper bias among arbitrators.59
The lesson of these studies is that while correlation can provide support for a
researcher’s hypothesis about causation, 60 it does not prove it. For any reasonably
complex phenomenon, such as adjudicatory decision-making, a range of possible
hypotheses can explain observed correlations in data.61 This insight is a cornerstone of
scientific methodology. Nevertheless, in discussing their findings, many studies,
including studies in investment arbitration, elide discussion of their hypotheses about
causation and the empirical correlations observed.62 In addition, even careful studies that

55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

61.
62.

Numerous commentators have written presuming that, as rational actors, arbitrators necessarily
decide cases with an eye to earning future appointments. Although this presumed influence of
self-interest is often stated as a matter of fact, it is, in reality, only a hypothesis.
See Sarah R. Cole & Kristen M. Blankley, Empirical Research on Consumer Arbitration: What the
Data Reveals, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1051, 1052 (2009) (critiquing the 2007 Public Citizen report
entitled, “The Arbitration Trap: How Credit Card Companies Ensnare Consumers” as relying on
anecdotal evidence instead of statistical data).
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitration,
25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL 843, 913 (2010).
See id.
See id.
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 4 (2007) (“[T]he reader [of
empirical studies] should not place undue importance on a finding of statistical significance,
because such a finding shows a correlation between variables but by itself does not prove the
substantive significance of that correlation.”).
See Sisk, supra note 3, at 887 (“Statistical analysis simply cannot capture the full dimension
of that unique and important human enterprise known as judging.”).
For example, even if generally careful, Van Harten implies that a higher than expected rate of
rulings in favor of investors suggests systemic bias: “If the system is meant to provide an
impartial and independent adjudicative process based on principles of rationality, fairness,
and neutrality, then the interpretation and application of the law should reflect a degree of
evenness between claimants and respondent states in the resolution of contentious legal
issues arising from ambiguous treaty texts[.]” Van Harten, supra note 44, at 216. Waibel and
Wu, meanwhile, include in their stated hypothesis not only the testable aspects of their
theories, but a causal explanation, hypothesizing that “Arbitrators from developing countries
are less likely to hold the host country liable because they are more familiar with the economic
and social conditions in developing countries and host countries the more likely source of future
arbitral appointments.” Waibel & Wu, supra note 28, at 23 (emphasis added). Several other
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limit discussion of the actual empirical findings themselves often play down or ignore
methodological limitations in stating more general conclusions that may be drawn from
the studies.63
3.

Ideology and Policy Preferences

Another common problem with empirical research into adjudicatory decision-making
is that it seeks to test the effect of decision-makers’ political ideologies or policy
preferences. Such ideologies and preferences are nearly impossible to measure directly.
Instead, researchers use indirect sources and proxies for decision-makers’ actual policy
preferences. In research regarding the U.S. judiciary, for example, common sources for
ascribing ideology are the political party of the appointing president,64 social background
and experience, newspaper evaluations of judges, and prior judicial decisions. 65 More
recently, scholars have questioned whether reliance on ideology (even assuming that
proxy measures were accurate gauges of ideology) adequately “distinguish[es] between
values as a self-conscious motive for decision-making and values as a subconscious
influence on cognition.”66 This is an important distinction when assessing adjudicatory
decision-making because self-conscious imposition of policy preferences teeters close to
bias or professional misconduct, whereas subconscious influence is simply part of what it
means to be human.
This methodological hurdle has particularly important implications for research in
investment arbitration. Critiques of investment arbitration often speak in terms of an
over-simplified dichotomy between a “pro-investor” and a “pro-state” orientation. 67 In

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
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possible hypotheses could explain an observed correlation. See also Waibel & Wu, supra note
28, at 20 (stating that they are inquiring into whether “the fact that many arbitrators wear
another hat as advocates in concurrent ICSID cases for the investor or the host state colors
their decision making” not simply whether there is a correlation between identified factors).
See also Waibel & Wu, supra note 28, at 39 (“Our empirical analysis shows that arbitrators
appear to be influenced, in some cases, by their policy views and do not simply apply the law
as it stands when deciding investment cases.”) (emphasis added).
See Van Harten, supra note 38, at 9 (arguing for greater caution on the part of the researcher in
the statement of conclusions).
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ET AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (2006).
Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the
“Affirmance Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 357, 366 (2005).
Dan M. Kahan, ‘Ideology in’ vs. ‘Cultural Cognition of’ Law: What Difference Does it Make?,
Harvard Law Sch. Program on Risk Regulation, Research Paper No. 08-22, 2008, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111865, at 1.
See Waibel & Wu, supra note 28, at 21 (using “pro-investor” to refer to a “worldview” that
“attach[es] overriding importance to the protection of investment (“property rights”), over and
above other societal goals”). Despite using this terminology, Waibel and Wu acknowledge that
“even if an arbitrator is seen as being pro-investor or pro-state, these predispositions do not
necessarily correspond to a coherent political philosophy.” Id. at 36. Relatedly, they acknowledge
that policy preferences are not “directly observable,” see id. at 22, and hence they use as a proxy
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contrast to the liberal/conservative dichotomy to describe ideologies that have been used
in judicial contexts, this characterization aligns not simply with ideological preferences.
Instead, it links presumed ideological preferences with particular parties (investors or
States). While self-consciously allowing political ideology to influence legal decisionmaking may raise questions close to (and sometimes even over) the line of professional
propriety, expressly preferring one party over another reaches far over on the wrong side
of that line. For these reasons, characterizations of ideology in empirical studies of
investment arbitrators raise not only the same methodological problems that arise in
studies of judicial decision-making, but also seem to improperly impugn the professional
conduct of arbitrators in the absence of actual proof of bias.
4.

Over-Simplification of Outcomes

Empirical analysis of inputs and outcomes of an adjudicatory process must be
translated into mathematical terms. There are several ways to translate outcomes into
dependent variables, though the most common types are binary win-loss outcomes.68 This
approach has been criticized in the context of appellate cases because there are more
than two possible dispositions, including affirmed in part and remanded, affirmed in part
and reversed in part, etc. 69 The complexity of outcomes to legal disputes can lead to
coding errors when reducing dispositions to binary outcomes.
A related, and “perhaps the most troubling,” critique regarding research in the U.S.
court system is that researchers investigate only the outcomes of decisions, not their
content. Thus, a disposition on procedural grounds is treated the same as a decision on
the merits.70 In addition, this approach is unable to take account of differences between
“[o]pinions that reach broad conclusions of law and include significant dicta” versus
“opinions that decide cases narrowly on only the arguments presented” and opinions that
“hew closely to precedent” or decide cases “on first principles.” 71 Scholars have been
developing methodologies for engaging in systematic content-based analysis of legal
decisions. To date, however, even newer theories cannot fully account for the role of legal
reasoning and the role of precedent and doctrine.72
In a field as new as investment arbitration, the legal texts are inherently ambiguous,
and even legal methodologies are very much debated. In this setting in particular, it may
well be that the content of decisions, rather than the outcomes, have more to tell us about

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

repeat appointments by one category of parties or another.
See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1924.
Id. at 1924.
Id. at 1926-27.
Id.
Sisk, supra note 3, at 884 (“A fully specified legal model will prove eternally elusive because legal
reasoning is not formulaic in nature: the reasonable parameters for debate on the determinate
nature of text and doctrine cannot be described by number.”).
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how the field is evolving.

G. Conclusion
Empirical studies of investment arbitration face all the same challenges as research
into national judicial decision-making, as well as some additional challenges related to
the nature of the field.73 Investment arbitration is still in its “adolescence.”74 It operates
in a volatile and politically charged environment. At least some empirical research is
formulated with the articulated aim of proving some of the field’s most controversial
contentions, specifically that investment arbitrators are biased or are free from bias.75
The problem is that, while these contentions cannot be proven, an audience eager for
data may be too willing to (mis)interpret the research as definitive proof of the policies
they seek to promote.76
The inability to prove systemic bias in investment arbitration extends beyond the
general methodological challenges described above. It is inherent in the nature of
empirical research itself. Empirical research tests a hypothesis about the relationship
between two or more variables. It can find tentative support for a hypothesis and
disprove alternative hypotheses, thereby indirectly supporting the likelihood of the
working hypothesis. It can never prove a hypothesis. In Karl Popper’s famous
explanation, the hypothesis that “all swans are white” cannot be proven true by any
number of observations of white swans, but the sighting of just one black swan may
disprove it.77 This important limitation is often lost on casual consumers of empirical
research or overlooked by over-enthusiastic onlookers.
As noted above,78 members of the wider investment arbitration community and its
skeptics are avid, but not always sophisticated, consumers of empirical data that might
support their policy interests. While a welcome contribution to the important debates of
the day, empirical findings should be evaluated against the backdrop of a clear
understanding of methodological limitations and without an expectation that any
empirical data, no matter how titillating, can definitively resolve the critical questions
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Yackee, supra note 18, at 403 (“[E]mpirically studying epistemic communities [like the
international investment law community] poses certain difficulties.”).
Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty
System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 45, 49 (2013).
Compare Waibel & Wu, supra note 28, with SUNSTEIN ET AL., supra note 64, and Eric Posner &
Miguel de Figueiredo, Is the International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 599 (2005).
Susan Franck, Development and Outcomes of Investment Treaty Arbitration, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J.
435, 488 (2009) (“While the general initial results are encouraging, one should contextualize them
properly, given their limitations. The presence of the two statistically significant simple effects
also suggests that there are areas ripe for targeted reform.”).
See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Individualization Fallacy in Forensic Science
Evidence, 61 VAND. L. REV. 199 (2008).
See supra Section I.A.
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facing the investment arbitration regime. As a leading commentator has noted in the
judicial context, “[e]mpirical study has yet to demonstrate that any extralegal factor—
ideology, judicial background, strategic reaction to other institutions, the nature of
litigants, or the makeup of appellate panels—explains more than a very small part of the
variation in outcomes (when exploring large numbers of judicial decisions in diverse
subject-matter areas).”79
The next Part examines two empirical studies that have generated some significant
debate in investment arbitration, in part because they have been over-read (at least by
some) as suggesting, if not proving, the existence of bias among investment arbitrators.80
Part III then draws on the observations in the first two Parts to suggest future directions
for research in investment arbitration.

II. Empirical Research Tied to Reform Proposals
Reform proposals for investment arbitration have been proliferating.81 Some emanate
from the most esteemed ranks of investment arbitrators and others from its most ardent
critics. This Part assesses two such proposed reforms. Section A begins with proposals to
eliminate, or at least greatly restrict, dissenting opinions. Section B takes up the most
radical reform proposal of all—elimination of investment arbitration altogether in favor
of an International Investment Court.

79.
80.

81.

Sisk, supra note 3, at 877.
Other studies have been over-read as definitively disproving the existence of bias in investment
arbitration. For example, Susan Franck’s work is often characterized as disproving bias in
investment arbitration, even though she states clearly that “further research is necessary” and
that her research provides a basis for “cautious[] optimis[m]” rather than definitive proof. See
Franck, supra note 76; Kapeliuk, supra note 10, at 48 (finding that repeat arbitrators “display no
biases and no tendencies to ‘split the difference”’); see also Gus Van Harten, Reply, 2010-2011 Y.B.
INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y. (replying to Susan Franck, Calvin Garbin & Jenna Perkins, Response:
Through the Looking Glass: Understanding Social Science Norms for Analyzing International
Investment Law, in Y.B. INT’L INV. L. & POL’Y 883 (Karl. P. Sauvant ed., 2010-11).
Apart from proposals to eliminate entirely investment arbitration, most proposed reforms aim at
procedures in investment arbitration that indirectly rein in investment arbitrators or increase
their accountability. The most popular proposed reform is to develop an appellate body to increase
consistency in awards. See Johanna Kalb, Creating an ICSID Appellate Body, 10 UCLA J. INT’L L.
& FOREIGN AFF. 179 (2005); Katia Yannaca-Small, Improving the System of Investor-State Dispute
Settlement: The OECD Governments' Perspective, in APPEALS MECHANISM IN INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT DISPUTES 14 (Karl P. Sauvant & Michael Chiswick-Patterson, eds., 2008). The other
important set of reform proposals aim at increasing transparency and third-party participation, a
reform recently realized in an important set of UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in TreatyBased Investor-State Arbitration. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Rules on
Transparency
in
Treaty-Based
Investor-State
Arbitration
(July
30,
2013),
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/rules-on-transparency/pre-releaseUNCITRAL-Rules-on-Transparency.pdf. For a more general assessment of recent reforms, see
Andrew P. Tuck, Investor-State Arbitration Revised: A Critical Analysis of the Revisions and
Proposed Reforms to the ICSID and UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 13 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 885
(2007).
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A. Dissents by Party-Appointed Arbitrators
In a highly-publicized study, leading international arbitrator and scholar Albert van
den Berg presented the “astonishing fact” that nearly all dissents written by partyappointed arbitrators are written in favor of the party who appointed them.82 This is a
number that captures attention and, perhaps predictably, has been cited as a source of
support for proposed reforms by Jan Paulsson, another leading arbitrator and scholar,
that party-appointed arbitrators be abolished altogether.83 In assessing the importance of
van den Berg’s findings and their potential implications for reform proposals, it is
essential first to locate them in a larger framework.84
1.

Overall Frequency of Dissents

As a starting point, it is helpful to first look at how frequently dissents are being
issued by party-appointed arbitrators. Van den Berg identifies 34 dissenting opinions by
party-appointed arbitrators out of a total of 150 decisions studied.85 Although we can
easily calculate that those numbers translate into an approximately 22% rate of
occurrence of such dissents, that calculation does not tell us much. What we need to
know is: Is 22% a “big” number?86 To answer that question, we need to ask further: “big”
compared to what?87
Van den Berg appears to suggest that the appropriate baseline for comparison should

82.
83.
84.
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Albert van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment
Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W.
MICHAEL REISMAN 824 (2010).
See Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 FOREIGN INV. L.J. 339
(2010).
I do not in this paper undertake either to update van den Berg’s research, which examined awards
only through December 31, 2008, or to independently reassess his classification of particular
separate opinions as dissenting (as opposed to concurring).
In addition, although van den Berg limits his analysis to dissents authored by party-appointed
arbitrators, his discussion sometimes may give the reader the misimpression that only partyappointed arbitrators draft dissenting opinions. In fact, van den Berg acknowledges that a small,
but statistically significant number of dissents are authored by arbitrators who are not appointed
by a party. Although van den Berg does not undertake to identify the total number of dissents, he
incidentally references to at least seven dissenting opinions authored by arbitrators who were not
appointed by a party. Given the small sample size, and the attempt to discern arbitrator
incentives for authoring dissents, it is difficult to see how these other dissents can be considered
statistically insignificant, at least in understanding overall rates of dissent in investment
arbitration. Even if the seven additional dissents not by party-appointed arbitrators are a full
accounting of that category of dissents, that would change the overall rate of dissents to 27% and
mean that in van den Berg’s sample the rate of overall dissents that are written in favor of
appointing parties is significantly lower than the near 100% that van den Berg cites.
See Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy¸ supra note 54, at 4 (quoting MICHAEL BLASTLAND &
ANDREW DILNOT, THE NUMBERS GAME: THE COMMONSENSE GUIDE TO UNDERSTANDING NUMBERS
IN THE NEWS, IN POLITICS, AND IN LIFE (2009)).
Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy¸ supra note 54, at 5.
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be nearly zero. He argues against various justifications for dissenting opinions, and
concludes that they are only appropriate in extraordinary circumstances, such as if
“[s]omething went fundamentally wrong in the arbitral process” or the “arbitrator has
been threatened” with physical danger.88 This perspective about dissenting opinions may
well be tied to van den Berg’s own legal background in the civil law tradition, which
historically disfavors (or prohibits) dissenting opinions.89 If the appropriate baseline for
the number of dissents were near zero, the 22% level could be considered high.90
A zero or near-zero baseline would be appropriate in some domestic contexts,
particularly those civil law systems that prohibit dissenting opinions or do not have an
existing practice of them. A zero baseline, however, does not seem appropriate in
investment arbitration because the ICSID Convention expressly authorizes dissenting
opinions.91 Moreover, the existing practice in investment arbitration is consistent with
prevailing practices among a range of other international tribunals that incorporate both
civil law and common law participants and procedures.92
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Van den Berg, supra note 82, at 831.
Van den Berg himself makes this point, quoting French Scholar and delegate to the 1899 Hague
Peace Conference Chevilier Descamps, who reasoned that dissenting opinions improperly create
“the appearance of there being two judgments.” Van den Berg, supra note 82, at 828.
A compelling argument could be made, and has been made by van den Berg in correspondence
on this issue, that a 22% dissent rate is a “big” number in comparison with rates of dissent in
international commercial arbitration. Email from Albert van den Berg to author, Oct. 4, 2013
(on file with author). According to one study, in ICC cases, there are dissents in less than 9%
of cases and in LCIA cases in less than 3% of cases. Peter J. Rees and Patrick Rohn,
Dissenting Opinions: Can they Fulfil a Beneficial Role?, 25(3) ARB. INT’L 329 (2009). While
these numbers are considerably lower than investment arbitration, at least according to some
commentators, lower rates of dissent in international commercial arbitration are appropriate
if not expected. See C Mark Baker & Lucy Greenwood, Dissent - But Only If You Really Feel
You Must: Why Dissenting Opinions in International Commercial Arbitration Should Only
Appear in Exceptional Circumstances, 7 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 31, 39-40 (2013). While
international commercial arbitration is an interesting point of reference, public international
tribunals may be a more appropriate baseline because most critiques of investment
arbitration are based on its lack of resemblance to public international tribunals, not its
commonalities with international commercial arbitration.
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other
States, Regulations and Rules art. 48(4) (Mar. 18, 1965), available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/CRR_English-final.pdf (reprinted Apr.
2006) [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
See Charles N. Brower & Charles B. Rosenberg, The Death of the Two-Headed Nightingale: Why
the Paulsson-van den Berg Presumption that Party-Appointed Arbitrators are Untrustworthy is
Wrongheaded,
GLOBAL
ARB.
REV.
(2012),
http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/cdn/files/gar/articles/Charles_Brower_The_Death_of_the_
Two-Headed_Nightingale_Speech_2.pdf (identifying a range of international tribunals that
expressly permit dissenting opinions, including the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, the
International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the
International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special
Tribunal for Lebanon, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights).
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Data is not available on the spectrum of dissent rates among international tribunals,93
but the one available example is helpful. According to one study, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) included at least one dissenting opinion in 900 out of 6,749
judgments.94 While this yields just over a 13% rate of dissents, the study found that in
cases that were not routine, cases that made “a significant contribution to the
development, clarification or modification of its caselaw,” the rate of dissenting opinions
was approximately 42%.95 Investment arbitration is still encountering a range of complex
and novel issues, which may suggest that this 42% is a helpful baseline for
understanding what might constitute a reasonable rate of dissenting opinions.
Judge Charles Brower and Charles Rosenberg, in an extensive review and critique of
van den Berg’s findings, have argued that rates of dissent among Supreme Courts in
several other countries are an appropriate baseline. Dissents in these courts range from a
relatively unusual low of 25% through a high of 62% for the U.S. Supreme Court. 96
Against this baseline, the 22% rate of dissents among party-appointed arbitrators in
investment arbitration seems quite appropriate if not even strikingly low. Statistics from
national Supreme Courts are interesting touchstones, but may not be appropriate as a
baseline for comparison since each of these courts is composed of more than three
members, making unanimity more difficult and the potential for dissents more likely
than with three-person tribunals.97
If aiming for comparison with three-person tribunals, another potential baseline
might be decisions by the three-judge panels on U.S. appellate courts. There, the
percentage of dissenting opinions is only 10% for published decisions. 98 Although
considerably lower than the 22% in van den Berg’s study, this difference might be
expected given that appellate decisions involve a narrower range of issues and are made
within a framework of bounded discretion and assumed facts. Moreover, national legal
systems have well-developed bodies of precedent that guide judicial decision-making.99

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
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Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, The Doctrinal Paradox and International Law, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 67, 99 (2012) (“[T]here have not yet been any articles or studies that have comprehensively
examined dissent rates in international courts.”).
Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence from the European
Court of Human Rights, 61 INT’L ORG. 669, 684 (2007) (citing statistics from 1960 through June
30, 2006).
See id. (noting that many unanimous decisions by the ECHR are very routine, such as the 1,377
judgments considering Italian violations of protections against excessive delays in court
proceedings).
Brower & Rosenberg, supra note 92, at 643 (citing rate of 62% dissents for the U.S. Supreme
Court, 25% and 37% for the previous year for the Canadian Supreme Court, and 36% for the
Australian High Court).
Unlike investment arbitral tribunals, supreme courts are also appellate courts, not courts of first
instance. This point is discussed in more detail in the pages that follow.
Edwards & Livermore, supra, note 27, at 1943.
Id. at 1944. Some empirical research aims directly at investigating the extent to which precedent
operates as a constraining force on judicial decision-making.
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While interpreting and applying those sources may produce some disagreement,
investment arbitration frequently involves novel legal questions, ambiguous treaty
language, facts interpreted through cross-cultural and multi-national filters, and (if
assumptions are correct) a deep ideological divide among parties and arbitrators.
Previous awards are often cited, and arguably represent a form of soft precedent. But
unlike in a system with formal stare decisis, the existence of a previous award directly on
point does not necessarily provide an answer on the same issue for a subsequent panel.
Against the backdrop of these considerations, a 22% dissent rate arguably might
suggest that party-appointed arbitrators are exercising a commendable degree of
restraint in the frequency with which they issue dissents. At a minimum, even in
absolute terms, the level of unanimous awards (in at least 78% of cases, party-appointed
arbitrators do not dissent in favor of the party who appointed them) means that a
unanimous tribunal decides the vast majority of cases. This 78% unanimity rate would,
at the very least, undermine van den Berg’s hypotheses about the emergence of
“mandatory” dissents”100 (in which case we might expect dissents in all or almost all
cases) or more general concerns that “politics and partisan ideological gamesmanship
rule[] the day” for party-appointed arbitrators.101
2.

Coding Opinions as Dissents

Brower and Rosenberg also suggest that the actual percentage of party-appointed
arbitrator dissents favoring an appointing party is lower than 22%. According to Brower
and Rosenberg, at least five opinions that van den Berg classifies as dissents in favor of
an appointing party should instead be classified either as concurrences or as not
“favoring” the appointing party. The classification of dissents is typical of the potential
for selection bias in the coding process. Van den Berg’s general skepticism about dissents
may have contributed to his interpretation of any disagreement with a majority that
ruled against a party-appointed arbitrator’s appointing party as “favoring” that party,
even if the apparent favor was of little or no value.
Brower and Rosenberg undertake a more substantive and qualitative approach to
classifying the dissents. Those dissents that mostly agree with the majority (for example
dissenting on only minor points) or that seek to clarify how the award should be
understood for future cases, are not counted as dissents favoring the appointing party,
even if the position asserted is one that might be, in itself, more aligned with the
appointing party’s position.
Given the small sample size (only 34 dissents overall), this disagreement over coding

100. Van den Berg, supra note 82, at 830.
101. Cf. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1944 (discussing high level of consensus in published
U.S. appellate court decisions).
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methodology has potentially significant ramifications for van den Berg’s final conclusion.
Reassignment of five out of 34 cases along the lines suggested by Brower and Rosenberg
would have a statistically significant effect on the overall number of dissents authored by
party-appointed arbitrators. Even assuming there were no more than five cases that need
to be reassigned,102 instead of nearly 100% of dissents being “in favor” of the appointing
party, as van den Berg concluded, the rate would be closer to 85%. This is still a high
rate, but not as staggering as the near-100% reported by van den Berg.
Even if the rate is closer to 85%, that rate would still indicate that, when they do
dissent, party-appointed arbitrators usually (according to Brower and Rosenberg) or
almost always (according to van den Berg) dissent in favor of the party who appointed
them. They dissent, according to van den Berg, at a much higher rate in favor of their
appointing party than can be explained by chance,103 though arguably the sample size is
too small for this conclusion to be statistically valid.
Even assuming that chance cannot explain the correlation, however, such a
correlation does not in itself suggest misconduct by individual party-appointed
arbitrators or systemic disregard of party-appointed arbitrators’ professional obligations,
including the duty of impartiality.104 The high correlation could be a result of the fact
that party-appointed arbitrators are, consistent with applicable rules, intentionally
selected by parties. In selecting arbitrators, parties generally consider arbitrators’
background, experience, existing decisional history, and legal and cultural background.
They seek, subject to standards for challenge based on bias, to ensure that the arbitrator
they appoint will represent on the tribunal their perspectives on the case.
Against this practice for selecting party-appointed arbitrators, it would be surprising
if we observed many (any?) dissenting opinions authored by party-appointed arbitrators
in favor of the opposing party. Certainly, we would not expect them to issue dissenting
opinions for their appointing party at the same level as chance, as van den Berg suggests,
because they are not randomly selected. They represent one party’s preference for a
decision-maker and are selected based on a careful assessment. 105 If party-appointed
arbitrators were, with any degree of regularity, writing dissenting opinions in favor of an
opposing party, it would mean that parties were doing an exceptionally poor job of
identifying party-appointed arbitrators.106
102. I do not explore here the potential implications of such reclassifications because the data relating
to possible reclassification is neither systematic nor complete.
103. Van den Berg, supra note 82, at 824.
104. If party appointed arbitrators were “now expected to dissent if the party that appointed him or her
has lost the case entirely or in part,” we would expect that the rate of party-appointed arbitrators
dissenting to be much higher than 22%. Van den Berg, supra note 82, at 824.
105. Martin Hunter, Ethics of the International Arbitrator, 4 ASA BULL. 173, 179 (1986).
106. This approach to selecting party-appointed arbitrators raises questions about their obligations of
impartiality. Notably, Jan Paulsson finds these questions troubling enough to argue for
elimination of the practice of so-called “unilateral appointments.” See Paulsson, supra note 83. For
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3.

The Benefits of Dissenting Opinions

Dissenting opinions may facilitate structural refinement of decisional methodologies
in investment arbitration. Scholars of judicial decision-making have identified the socalled “doctrinal paradox,” which posits that complex cases involving two or more
independent issues may be capable of different outcomes by the same decision-makers
depending on whether the tribunal decides the case on an issue-based analysis (deciding
independent issues on an issue-by-issue basis) or a conclusion-based analysis (deciding
cases based on agreement about a final outcome). 107 Given the rapid evolution of
international investment law, and the already-profound challenges to inconsistent and
indeterminate outcomes, focus is on the doctrinal paradox, and its potential effects may
hold specific benefits for the development of investment law.108
Issue-based decision-making would arguably increase transparency and enhance the
legitimacy of arbitral awards by tying outcomes more closely to actual consensus on
particular issues, rather than consensus about final outcomes. Proponents argue that
issue-based analysis, and more generally clarity about which methodology is being
applied, may reduce the potential for political decision-making.109 Consideration of the
effect of the doctrinal paradox, and the potential for introducing an issue-by-issue
decisional methodology, is directly attributable to the emergence of dissenting
opinions.110
Another way dissenting opinions may contribute to the legitimacy of investment
arbitration is in promoting party acceptance of awards. For example, in Wena Hotels Ltd.
v. Egypt, the arbitrator appointed by Egypt issued a two-sentence statement that he
“concurs in the Tribunal’s entire award,” including the award of compound interest, but
was “not persuaded that compounding should be quarterly.”111 The separate opinion on a
narrow, and seemingly insignificant issue, arguably underscores the arbitrator’s

107.

108.

109.
110.
111.

an affirmative case in favor of party-appointed arbitrators and an analysis of their impartiality
obligations, see CATHERINE A. ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2014)
(forthcoming).
For a detailed explication of the doctrinal paradox, known to political scientists as “Ostrogorski’s
paradox,” see Manuel Conthe, Majority Decision in Complex Arbitration Cases: The Role of IssueBy-Issue
Voting
(2010),
http://www.josemigueljudicearbitration.com/xms/files/02_TEXTOS_ARBITRAGEM/01_Doutrina_ScolarsTexts/awards/Majorit
y_decisions_and_issue-by-issue_voting.pdf.
Adam Chilton & Dustin Tingley, The Doctrinal Paradox and International Law, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L
L. 67, 68 (2012). See also id. at 128 (reasoning that, to the extent outcome-based decision-making
“creates less intelligible precedent, these concerns have particular force given that the corpus of
international law is still in its infancy”).
Id. at 72-73, 82.
See id. at 98.
See Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Statement of
Professor Don Wallace, Jr. (Dec. 8, 2000), 6 ICSID Rep. 68, 128 (2004).
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substantive agreement with the rest of the tribunal on the balance of the issues.112 In the
absence of the separate opinion, the appointing party would not know that the arbitrator
affirmatively agreed with the tribunal’s decision, and may well assume the award was
effectively a 2-1 decision with acquiescence (not affirmative agreement) by its partyappointed arbitrator. Knowing that the arbitrator it selected affirmatively agreed with
the substance of an award may contribute to that party’s acceptance of the outcome as
legitimate.
In sum, van den Berg’s study of dissenting opinions raises important questions and
has made a significant contribution to this debate. It also, however, demonstrates how
starting policy preference can influence empirical analysis and how even striking
empirical findings should not be a basis for proposed reforms without more holistic
analysis of the substance and function of the phenomenon studied.

B. Proposals for an International Investment Court
Gus Van Harten has proposed the establishment of an international investment court
to displace investment arbitration. 113 Van Harten’s view, shared by others, 114 is that
private arbitrators are not suited or appropriate to resolve public law issues. 115
Arbitrators’ lack of secure tenure and ensured compensation, he argues, undermine the
administrative independence that protects independence and impartiality in national
courts and public international law tribunals.116 Van Harten believes that a permanent
investment arbitration court, in which judges share features with national court judges,
could resolve perceptions of bias that derive from these features of investment
arbitrators.117 This section challenges some of the assumptions underlying Van Harten’s
112. Notably, because it is a relatively small sample, if this and the other cases Brower and Rosenberg
argue are not treated as dissents and are subtracted from van den Berg’s sample, the overall rate
of dissents would be less than twenty percent. Moreover, the percentage of dissents favoring an
appointing party would be closer to eighty-five percent not one hundred percent. This latter
number still represents a strong correlation between party-appointed arbitrators and dissents
favoring the appointing party. As explained below, however, this correlation may well be the
result of factors other than rank partisanship.
113. VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note 23, at 3.
114. Barnali Choudhury, Recapturing Public Power: Is Investment Arbitration’s Engagement of the
Public Interest Contributing to the Democratic Deficit? 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 775, 782
(2008) (arguing that “interference with these [national] regulations by unelected and
unappointed arbitrators is not consistent with basic principles of democracy”).
115. Gus Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, Soc’y of Int’l Econ. Law (SIEL)
Inaugural
Conference
2008
Paper,
No.
22/08
(2008),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153424, at 16.
116. Some of Van Harten’s and others’ arguments relate to the lack of reciprocity in the current
investment arbitration regime (only investors can bring claims), and the absence of an appellate
mechanism to ensure consistency. VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra note
23, at 20. Those concerns, while not entirely unrelated to the arguments here, they are beyond the
scope of this paper.
117. There are other objections that do not relate directly to international arbitrators, such as limited
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proposal, particularly those tied to empirical research that he has more recently
undertaken.
One of the primary advantages of a permanent international investment court under
Van Harten’s view is that it would eliminate ad hoc arbitrators in favor of permanent
judges. Permanent appointment, it is presumed, structurally ensures independence
because it avoids potential incentives that ad hoc arbitrators may have to skew their
rulings in a way that will ensure future reappointment or more generally enlarge the
body of arbitration cases. 118 Although framed as a structural critique of investment
arbitration, at least some aspects of Van Harten’s proposal appear to be implicitly
intertwined with policy preferences and a presumption that those preferences may be
more likely to prevail in a more traditional court structure.
One such policy preference, for example, is Van Harten’s apparent preference for a
restrictive scope of jurisdiction to review States’ actions regarding foreign investors. Van
Harten hypothesizes that investment arbitrators are more likely to adopt an expansive
approach to various contested issues of jurisdiction because of “apparent financial or
career interests of arbitrators or by wider economic aims of the arbitration industry.”119
The implied negative assumption appears to be that replacing arbitrators with
permanent judges will reduce the tendency toward expansive interpretations of
jurisdiction.
Van Harten’s empirical research demonstrates a tendency of arbitrators to adopt what
he has defined as an “expansive” approach to issues of jurisdiction. He concludes that his
study offers “tentative support for expectations of systemic bias” in investment
arbitration, but he also acknowledges its limitations.120 Despite his robust findings on
this particular issue, Van Harten acknowledges that “they do not establish all of the
steps of logic that would be required to connect the observed tendency to the underlying

access by third parties, continued limits on transparency and the inability of States to bring
claims. While important issues about system design, which are also related to Van Harten’s
proposal, these system features are beyond the scope of this paper.
118. Although Van Harten bolsters his arguments in recent works with empirical claims, his original
calls for reform are based principally on perceptions of bias arising from the institutional structure
of investment arbitration. See generally VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION, supra
note 23, at 175-84. Although Van Harten is careful not to make express empirical claims of bias,
some of his arguments about perceptions of unfairness seem to be based on implicit empirical
assumptions. See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration, Procedural Fairness, and the
Rule of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW 627, 627
(Stephan W. Schill ed., 2010) (“Investment treaty arbitration is often promoted as a fair, rulesbased system . . . . This claim is undermined, however, by procedural and institutional aspects of
the system that suggest it will tend to favour claimants and, more specifically, those states and
other actors that wield power over appointing authorities or the system as a whole.”) (emphasis
added). It is nearly impossible to make characterizations about a legal system that do not
implicate some empirical assumptions.
119. Van Harten, supra note 43, at 213.
120. See id. at 252.
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rationales for the hypothesis.” 121 There is, as Van Harten acknowledges, “a range of
possible explanations for the results—some of which do not at all entail inappropriate
bias.”122
One potential alternative explanation for the expansive approach to jurisdiction
observed in investment arbitration is that all adjudicators, both judges and arbitrators,
have a proclivity toward expanding their own jurisdiction. That proclivity, in other
words, may be tied not to arbitrators’ incentive to be appointed in future arbitrations, but
to other more general explanations about the way adjudicators view their function. In
fact, judges with permanent and fixed term appointments have, in various national legal
systems, been observed as adopting positions and interpretations that expand their
jurisdiction.123 The pattern may arguably be even more exaggerated among permanent
international tribunals, where there is a prevailing “assumption[] that judges share an
interest in expanding the reach of their court and that governments seek to present such
occurrences.” 124 In an ironic historical twist, traditional judicial hostility toward
commercial arbitration was the result of national courts guarding their jurisdiction
against arbitrator-interlopers. 125 At least with regard to policy preferences for more
circumscribed jurisdiction, a permanent international court may not change the current
situation.
Another concern that inspires Van Harten’s proposal for a permanent court is that ad
hoc appointment of arbitrators “create[s] apparent incentives for arbitrators to favour the

121. Id. at 239.
122. Id. at 215.
123. Manoj Mate, Two Paths to Judicial Power: The Basic Structure Doctrine and Public Interest
Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 175, 209-14 (2010) (documenting
strategies for expanding judicial jurisdiction in public interest litigation in India, the United
States and Israel). “[C]ourts act strategically in expanding their roles in governance and
policymaking through the gradual and incremental process of case-by-case dispute resolution, by
occasionally accommodating the political interests or agenda of political elites, and while
simultaneously broadening jurisdiction and its own remedial powers.” Id. at 210.
124. Voeten, supra note 94, at 671 (“[S]cholars have argued that the rulings” of various courts
including the ECJ and the WTO Appellate Body have “amounted to judicial policymaking” and
criminal tribunals have “helped to establish a substantial new body of international law.”); see also
Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals
Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2006); Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at
the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 247 (2004).
125. See H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 1-2 (1924) (discussing the jurisdictional “jealousy” of the courts and
the resulting refusal to enforce arbitration agreements) (cited in Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme
Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 91, 92-93 n.5
(2012)); see also John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for
Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REV. 219, 224 (1986)
(analyzing courts’ centuries-long struggle by the early courts for jurisdiction and their consequent
unwillingness to surrender it). In England, however, it may also have been related to English
judges’ almost complete reliance on fees from cases for their income, which meant that arbitrators
were unwelcome competitors. See id.
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class of parties (here, investors) that is able to invoke the use of the system.”126 His
argument for a permanent court, echoed by others, appears to be informed by an
assumption that members might be more likely to demonstrate deference to States and
their legitimate State interests. 127 This hypothesis is, in turn, based on certain
assumptions about both the nature of international courts and the composition of the
judiciary of a potential permanent investment court.
Van Harten and others who advocate for a permanent investment court seem to
assume that judges would be drawn from something other than the pool of existing
investment arbitrators, or from among a group of professionals with markedly different
professional profiles.128 A sudden willingness by States to put forward an entirely new
slate of investment judges who can replace investment arbitrators, and have a more
State-sensitive outlook, may be overly optimistic.129
At a more fundamental level, Van Harten’s and other critics’ calls for creation of a
permanent international investment court are premised on a general gestalt that such
courts would better serve the interests of States than ad hoc tribunals. Numerous
commentators who have been examining the recent proliferation in international
tribunals echo this confidence in permanent international courts. 130 The assumption
about the efficacy and desirability of permanent international courts, however, is subject
to debate and not entirely consistent with experience.
Instead, States have a long history of preferring international tribunals in which they

126. Van Harten, supra note 43, at 219.
127. Id.
128. For example, the vigorous critique of investment arbitration put out by the Corporate Europe
Observatory, entitled, Profiting from Injustice, critiques investment arbitrators as not having
public and government credentials that are necessary to understand States’ positions in
adjudicating investment disputes. Of the top 15 arbitrators they identify, however, most do seem
to have public international law experience. Stern is a professor of public international law;
Schwebel and Brower are former international court judges; and Schwebel, Brower, Vicuna,
Lalond, Fortier, and Price all have extensive government service experience. It seems difficult to
imagine that these repeatedly appointed arbitrators are so different in temperament or profile
than judges who may be appointed to a permanent investment court.
129. For example, many public law scholars express similar frustration that WTO judges fail to
account for social concerns, including human rights. This propensity is arguably tied to the fact
that judges were selected based on their knowledge of trade law.
130. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Legalized Dispute
Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 458 (2000) (“We define low
independence, access, and embeddedness as the ideal type of interstate dispute resolution and
high independence, access, and embeddedness as the ideal type of transnational dispute
resolution.”); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 300-36 (1997) (establishing a multifactor
checklist of what qualities are important in an international judicial body); Laurence R. Helfer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors
Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 904 (2005) (describing the benefits that States derive from
“independent” tribunals).
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can control, to some extent, the composition of the decision-maker panel.131 For example,
the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is a permanent court, allows States to
determine the identity of the adjudicators (through the ad hoc procedures) and the
overall composition of a panel that would hear an individual case. 132 According to
Stephen Schwebel, a former President of the ICJ and frequent arbitrator in investment
arbitration cases, the reasoning behind the ICJ’s statutory allowance of these “ad hoc
chambers” is “to permit the parties to the case to influence both the size and the
composition of the Chamber.”133 These mechanisms “provide States the comfort they seek
. . . that an international court will not venture beyond its assigned mandate.”134 These
control mechanisms are regarded as essential features to keep State parties continuing to
use the ICJ for their disputes.135
States’ interest in controlling the composition of decisional panels has, together with
other factors, led to what Gary Born refers to as a “second generation” of international
adjudication.136 This new generation of tribunals has eclipsed in both numbers and effect
traditional so-called “independent” permanent international courts.137 One reason for the
rise of second generation tribunals, including for some State-to-State disputes that could
otherwise go to the International Court of Justice, is that they allow States a degree of
control over the adjudicatory decision-maker that eludes them with traditional,
independent, permanent tribunals. Most notably, it permits them to control the
composition of the tribunal.138
While there is undoubtedly a mixed track record among States, those States with
sophisticated in-house legal departments or outside legal counsel can be as exacting as
investors in effectively managing the arbitrator selection process. 139 In one telling
example, back in the 1980s, when international telephone rates were high, efforts by U.S.
131. Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411,
419 (2008) (arguing that mechanisms of control “provide States the comfort they seek . . . that an
international court will not venture beyond its assigned mandate,” and suggesting that when
control mechanisms become perceived as inadequate, States will abandon their consent to the
jurisdiction of international institutions).
132. Stephen M. Schwebel, Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice, 81 AM. J. INT’L L.
831, 834 (1987).
133. Id.
134. Cogan, supra note 131, at 419.
135. Id.
136. Gary B. Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 775-76 (2012).
137. See id. at 819.
138. Jason Yackee has argued that party-appointed arbitrators are an imperfect control mechanism,
though in arguing for other thoughtful and important potential reforms outside the arbitration
process, he seems to discount the value of this control, in part by overstating ethical restrictions on
States’ ability to select arbitrators. Yackee, supra note 18, at 424 (arguing that “increasingly
constrained by institutional rules and system norms that impose upon IIL arbitrators stringent
standards of impartiality and independence”).
139. Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field: Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing
Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 255 (2007).
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counsel at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal to identify and investigate potential judges
earned them a call from Washington for racking up exorbitant phone bills! 140 The
contrasting example is that, despite recurring pleas from ICSID, less than half of the
parties to the ICSID Convention (and disproportionately few from among developing
economies) avail themselves of the right to make nominations to the List of
Arbitrators.141 One of the primary problems with representation of State interests among
arbitrators, therefore, may be the inability of (or lack of interest among) developing
States in effectively controlling the composition of investment arbitration panels. This is
a serious problem with the investment arbitration regime, but not necessarily one that
would be resolved by the creation of a permanent court.

C. Conclusion
While providing an important contribution, some of van den Berg’s analysis may be
traceable to pre-existing viewpoints that were not effectively separated from
methodological choices made in constructing the survey. For example, assumptions about
the appropriate baseline for comparing rates of dissenting opinions and the coding of
decisions about whether certain dissents favor an appointing party seem to be predicated
on assumptions tied to van den Berg’s perceptions about the limited utility of dissents.
Van Harten’s research is rigorously adherent to objective empirical methodologies,
despite his vociferous and oft-articulated critiques of investment arbitration in other
scholarship. Van Harten is also careful to disclaim having found proof of bias. 142
Nevertheless, alternative hypotheses might explain some of the statistical correlations
identified by Van Harten. While the possibility of alternative theories does not
undermine the quality of Van Harten’s research, it does suggest that even credible
empirical results need to be tested and evaluated in light of other forms of research.
In final conclusion, while this analysis has focused on some aspects of Van Harten’s
empirical work that are critical of investment arbitration, the cautionary note expressed
here is neither unique to his work specifically nor unique to empirical works whose
findings support critiques of investment arbitration generally.

140. George H. Aldrich, The Selection of Arbitrators, in THE IRAN-U.S. CLAIMS TRIBUNAL AND THE
PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS TRIBUNALS 65, 67 (David D. Caron & John R. Crook eds.,
2000).
141. At present, 108 out of the 158 Member States have made some form of arbitrator nomination. See
ICSID, Members of the Panels of Conciliators and of Arbitrators, ICSID/10, at 4-6 (Jan. 2013),
available
at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDoc
ument&reqFrom=ICSIDPanels&language=English.
142. See Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, supra note 23, at 5.
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III.The Role of Future Empirical Research in Investment
Arbitration
Empirical research has the potential to make meaningful contributions to existing
debates about investment arbitration. 143 Particularly with respect to a regime whose
caseload is exploding, whose doctrine is expanding at a breakneck pace, but whose
primary objectives and fundamental functions are still hotly contested, empirical
research can have an important role. It can test the assumptions that animate the most
serious critiques and ardent defenses of investment arbitration. In other areas of
international law, empirical research has also proven to be a useful tool for refining
“institutional design and practice to enhance international legal institutions’
effectiveness.”144 The potential contributions regarding arbitrators, however, should not
be overstated. Empirical research can neither identify the extent to which extra-legal
factors affect arbitral decision-making, nor disprove definitively the effect of those
factors. It cannot, in other words, prove or disprove systemic bias in arbitral decisionmaking.145
Part I identified some the most significant methodological challenges faced in doing
empirical research about investment arbitrators. These limitations mean that
researchers would be well advised to be “less expansive . . . in drawing conclusions from
their findings” and more careful in tying specific proposed reforms to empirical
findings.146 Moreover, the limited explanatory power of quantitative models has in other
areas prompted even committed empiricists to refocus on qualitative forms of legal
scholarship, meaning both theoretical and doctrinal analysis of legal issues. 147 In a
similar vein, this Part proposes that future research about the efficacy and system design
of investment arbitration expand beyond inquiries into alleged arbitrator bias, integrate
other forms of scholarship to cross-test some of the hypotheses that inspire such
empirical research, and engage in trans-institutional analysis of international tribunals.

A. Broadening the Scope of Inquiry
Investment arbitrators have been a primary focus of empirical research into
investment arbitration for many understandable and legitimate reasons.148 Arbitrators

143. Franck, supra note 9, at 4-5 (“Empirical legal scholarship can and should aid the examination
of the current system to test conventional wisdom, dispel myths, and provide data that can
promote efficient conflict management.”).
144. Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 9.
145. This is a point Van Harten makes repeatedly. For this reason, he predicates his calls for reform
not on findings of alleged bias, but rather the perception of bias. Van Harten, A Case for an
International Investment Court, supra note 23, at 1-3.
146. Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1907 (quoting Sisk, supra note 3, at 886 n.72).
147. See generally Sisk, supra note 3, at 891.
148. Other research into investment law more generally addresses questions about whether or to what
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are the most obvious determinants of outcomes, and their professional milieu makes an
intriguing target for study. Given this focus, it is perhaps not surprising that when
empirical research identifies correlations between particular features of disputes and
particular outcomes, the tendency is to attribute observed correlations to systemic bias of
arbitrators. While arbitrator bias may be the most obvious hypothesis, it is by no means
the only one. Myriad factors other than the arbitrators themselves can and inevitably do
affect case outcomes and therefore should be the object of more systematic and sustained
empirical study.
Take for example, again, Van Harten’s findings that there is a statistically significant
correlation between jurisdictional findings in favor of claimants generally, and even more
interestingly, in favor of several capital-exporting countries, particularly the United
States and the United Kingdom. Van Harten hypothesizes that arbitrators would be
“more responsive to the interests of [these claimants].” 149 Although he begins with a
working hypothesis of arbitrator bias, upon finding a correlation, Van Harten also notes
that several alternative hypotheses may explain the correlation, including:
factual or contextual variations that encourage arbitrators to bend the law in order
to assume or decline jurisdiction depending on claimant nationality; ideological
preferences that cause arbitrators to be more dubious of the legal arguments of
non-Western or capital-importing states and their nationals; variations in the
quality of legal representation or the wisdom of appointment decisions among
different claimant nationalities; variations in the degree to which specific cases
influence interpretations adopted in subsequent cases; disproportionate influence
by a small cohort of frequently appointed arbitrators who are represented on many
tribunals; structural factors such as the role of appointing authorities in choosing
arbitrators; or a complex and varying mix of these and other possible
explanations.150
In the final phrase of this list, Van Harten leaves open the possibility of still other
possible explanations.
One possible alternative explanation might be that more exacting fact-finding
techniques may be more likely to be pressed by parties or counsel from common law
jurisdictions, such as the U.S. and the UK.151 Such techniques may also be used more

extent BITs actually increase levels of foreign investment, and why States enter into BITs. See
Jason Webb Yackee, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Promote Foreign Direct Investment? Some
Hints from Alternative Evidence, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 397 (2011) (summarizing research into effect of
BITs); Todd Allee & Clint Peinhardt, Delegating Differences: Bilateral Investment Treaties and
Bargaining Over Dispute Settlement Provisions, 54 INT’L STUD. Q. 1 (2010).
149. Van Harten, supra note 43, at 224 (“These hypotheses [about jurisdictional interpretations
favorable to capital-exporting States] were based on expectations that arbitrators would be
more responsive to the interests of major Western capital-exporting states than those of other
states due to the relative influence of the former.”).
150. Id. at 249-250.
151. Conversely, fact-finding techniques may be less of a focus for German parties or less likely to
be pressed by civil law trained counsel, which may be a more likely choice for investors from
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often and more systematically by private firms, which are attuned to such techniques
from commercial arbitration and operating with more extensive budgets, than by States’
attorney generals. 152 More exacting fact-finding may help establish stronger factual
predicates for jurisdictional findings, and might be an alternative explanation for the
correlation observed.153
The role of counsel and strength of parties’ cases to date have not been important
focuses of empirical research. These omissions are particularly striking given some very
compelling anecdotal evidence about deficiencies in legal representation among smaller
and developing States.154 With the rise of third-party funding, the effect of counsel and
litigation resources is bound to become an even more important variable that warrants
more careful investigation. 155 If counsel and legal resources were identified as
contributing to disparate outcomes in cases, that finding would suggest very different
prescriptions for reform than if the disparate outcomes were attributable solely to
arbitrator bias. For this reason, they are important areas for future empirical study.
Relatedly, substantive differences in relevant BITs or other applicable law have not
been independently tested or effectively factored into studies testing for arbitrator
bias.156 Moreover, even if there is no formal system of stare decisis, awards in earlier
cases are often relied on as persuasive authority when similar issues arise in later cases.
For this reason, timing and the existence of earlier cases on point may explain some
trends in outcomes that are otherwise attributed to arbitrators. Particularly given the

152.

153.
154.
155.

156.
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Germany or France. See, e.g., Richard H. Kreindler, Amy C. Kläsener & Christina Cathey
Schuetz, International Arbitration, in BUSINESS LAWS OF GERMANY § 17:37 (2012) (describing
a more cautious and restrained approach by German attorneys and arbitrators regarding
evidentiary matters in international arbitration).
John R. Crook, Fact-Finding in the Fog: Determining the Facts of Upheaval and Wars in InterState Disputes, in THE FUTURE OF INVESTMENT ARBITRATION 313, 315-20 (Catherine A. Rogers &
Roger P. Alford eds., 2009) (discussing with approval fact-finding techniques in investor-State
arbitration in comparison to other public international tribunals).
See Frédéric G. Sourgens, Equal Contest of Arms: Jurisdictional Proof in Investor-State
Arbitrations, 38 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 875, 895-97 (2013) (analyzing the importance of
methods and standards for proving jurisdictional facts).
Gottwald, supra note 139, at 255 (documenting based on interview research severe resource and
experience deficits faced by counsel for Argentina and Seychelles).
Notably, ICCA and Queen Mary are jointly launching a Task Force to study and make
recommendations about the rise of third-party funding in international arbitration. See
International Council for Commercial Arbitration, Latest News (last visited Oct. 5, 2013),
http://www.arbitration-icca.org/news.html (Joint Taskforce on Third-Party Funding Launched,
July 3, 2013).
See Sourgens, supra note 153, at 879 (“As current scholarship demonstrates, the interpretation of
consent instruments can and does lead to facially inconsistent results. This inconsistency is not a
result of incompetent arbitrators, nor an inherent and insurmountable arbitrariness of investment
law. Rather, it results from the open-ended, “indeterminate” nature of advanced consents to
arbitration by participating states.”) (footnotes omitted). In his study, for example, Van Harten
distinguishes among different types of treaties, but does not consider the differing texts of such
treaties. See Van Harten, supra note 43.

The Politics of International Investment Arbitrators

small sample of investment arbitration cases, the existence of a few high-profile cases on
particular issues may have a significant impact on outcomes in subsequent cases.157 To
date, the role of precedent and legal doctrine has not been meaningfully accounted for in
empirical research in investment arbitration. Finally, as analyzed in Part I, there are
significant methodological challenges to assessing empirically these qualitative variables.
Critics may still maintain that broad jurisdictional rulings are undesirable. Crosstesting of empirical findings regarding arbitrator bias with other possible explanations
will confirm whether the primary source of their complaint is more likely arbitrator bias,
or may instead be tied to provisions in particular BITs or national law, 158 or other
features of the system. Refinements in research considering these other variables could
lead to more relevant reform proposals and avoid those proposals that would not
necessarily resolve the underlying concerns.159

B. Toward a Theory of International Adjudication
The rise of international courts and tribunals is routinely acknowledged as one of the
single most important recent developments in international law.160 International courts
and tribunals are described as “the lynchpin of a new, rule-based international order,
which increasingly displaces or purports to displace the previous power-based
international order.” 161 As a consequence, international adjudication has produced an
enormous body of scholarship—doctrinal, normative, and empirical.162 The robust body of

157. The heavy criticism that inconsistent awards have drawn may provide added incentives for
arbitrators to give weight to prior awards rather than engaging in a completely independent
analysis or reaching a different conclusion.
158. As noted in Part I, similar critiques have been raised regarding empirical research into judicial
decision making. See Edwards & Livermore, supra note 27, at 1926-27.
159. For similar research on the effects of advocacy before the U.S. Supreme Court, see Richard J.
Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by
Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487 (2008).
160. Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle,
31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709, 709 (1999) (“When future international legal scholars look back
at international law and organizations at the end of the twentieth century, they probably will
refer to the enormous expansion and transformation of the international judiciary as the single
most important development of the post-Cold War age.”); Bruno Simma, International
Adjudication and U.S. Policy – Past, Present, and Future, in DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW
39, 39 (Norman Dorsen & Prosser Gifford eds., 2001) (“International courts and tribunals are
proliferating, and the caseload of some of these institutions appears to explode.”).
161. Yuval Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts: A Goal-Based Approach, 106
AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 226 (2012) (citing Karen Alter, Private Litigants and the New
International Courts, 39 COMP. POL. STUD. 22 (2006)); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Between
Power and Principle: An Integrated Theory of International Law, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 469
(2005); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004); Harold H. Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997).
162. Laurence R. Helfer, Karen J. Alter & M. Florencia Guerzovich, Islands of Effective International
Adjudication: Constructing an Intellectual Property Rule of Law in the Andean Community, 103

257

12 SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 223 (2013)

empirical research on international courts and tribunals has helped sharpen debates over
their nature, function, and effectiveness.
Some empirical research into investment arbitration mimics the inquiries of these
studies about other tribunals, most notably empirical studies about alleged bias among
international judges. 163 Few scholars if any, however, have attempted to compare or
integrate empirical findings from other international tribunals—including findings
related to alleged decisional bias—with similar findings regarding investment
arbitration.
To the contrary, there appears to be a sharp and even ironic divergence in the nature
of inquiries about investment arbitration in comparison to other international tribunals.
In the debate over system design in international tribunals, analysis in other areas of
public international law, human rights, and international criminal law, appears focused
on ensuring strong adjudicatory mechanisms that subject State decision-making and
actions to international courts’ jurisdiction and judgments. Empirical research, as a
consequence, focuses on the strength and effectiveness of tribunals in enforcing
international law limits on State activities.164 When the category of international law
being enforced is the rights of foreign investors, however, many commentators seem
intent instead on prioritizing States’ ability to have their policy decisions and activities
unhampered by international investment law.165
To be sure, human rights violations, which often implicate jus cogens norms, and
violations of the rights of foreign investors are not moral equivalents. No plausible

AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2009) (“The growing number of international courts and their increasing
activity have attracted the interest of scholars of international law, international relations, and
comparative politics, leading to the launch of new empirical projects, a university press series, and
a specialized journal.”); Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 25 (surveying empirical research in
international law and tribunals, including investment law and investment arbitration).
163. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2005).
164. See, e.g., Laurence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997); Juscelino F. Colares, A Theory of WTO Adjudication:
From Empirical Analysis to Biased Rule Development, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 383 (2009);
Helfer, Alter & Guerzovich, supra note 162; Donald McRae, Measuring the Effectiveness of the
WTO Dispute Settlement System, 3 ASIAN J. WTO & INT’L HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1 (2008); Mike
Burstein, The Will to Enforce: An Examination of the Political Constraints upon a Regional Court
of Human Rights, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 423 (2006); Leah Granger, Explaining the Broad-Based
Support for WTO Adjudication, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 521 (2006); Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do
International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L.
REV. 777 (2006); William Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International
Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2002).
165. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary
Times: The Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral
Investment Treaties, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 326-27 (2007) (identifying as a weakness in investment
arbitration tribunals the inability under ICSID rules of States to appoint their own nationals to
ensure that arbitrators have sufficient understanding and sympathy for the context of States’
decision-making).
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explanation has been offered, however, about why a differential in the relative moral
value of those categories of rights justifies radically different objectives in system design
for the international tribunals. The more general claim of both public international law
and international investment law is that they impose international law limits on States’
decision-making and actions. International tribunals impose both categories of
international law limitations.
The apparent shift in scholarly enthusiasm about the efficacy and function of
international tribunals when investment law instead of human rights law is being
enforced seems to suggest that policy preferences are affecting system design
prescriptions in the different contexts. If the real objection to investment arbitration
outcomes is a substantive one (i.e., that the line protecting investor rights should be
drawn in a different place), then optimal reform proposals may not involve systemic
reforms to investment arbitration, but instead changes to substantive investment law.166
Moreover, a comprehensive theory of international adjudication, particularly one
premised on the notion that adjudication must be a neutral and law-bound process,
cannot develop if such policy preferences distort system design in international tribunals.
Comparative analysis between investment arbitration and other international
tribunals could help cut through some of these apparent inconsistencies. Such
comparative analysis could lead the way to a more comprehensive theory of international
adjudication and help strengthen assessments of some features of investment
arbitration. For example, one critique of investment arbitration is that it allows only for
claims by investors, but not by States. At first blush, inequality between parties seems
contrary to the nature of adjudication.167 Comparative analysis reveals, however, that
other adjudicatory regimes contemplate disputes in which one category of parties will
necessarily always be in a defensive posture and another category will have an exclusive
opportunity to assert affirmative claims. This unilateralism is true, for example, with
human rights claims before the ECHR, which can only be against States,168 and claims in
U.S. courts under the Alien Tort Statute, which are exclusively brought by “alien”

166. One obvious link between substance and system design is that the vague and indeterminate
nature of BIT and treaty provisions effectively delegates to arbitral tribunals substantial
interpretive power. While other areas of international law are arguably similarly indeterminate, a
reasonable argument can be made for greater delineation by States of the extent and limits of
investor rights. While greater definition would have the effect of reducing interpretive delegation
to investment arbitrators, it is a reform in the substance of investment law, not the system design
of investment arbitration.
167. V.S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 16-17 (Martinus Nijhoff
publishers 1980) (describing the history of audi alteram partem, or equality of the parties, in the
context of adjudication).
168. The ECHR’s jurisdiction extends to allegations brought against Member States for alleged
breaches of the Convention, but may be brought by either individuals or other member states.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms arts. 32,
33 & 34, Sept. 3, 1953, ETS No. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 222.
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individuals against either State actors or corporations.169
The asymmetry of legal proceedings reflects the fact that both substantive investment
law and human rights law address “the asymmetric legal relationship between sovereign
States and private actors operating within their boundaries.” 170 In this sense, [b]oth
international human rights law and international investment law seek to compensate for
the inferior legal position of individuals and investors under the domestic law of the
State in which they operate by enhancing legal protection at the international level.”171
Private enforcement of these rights is a natural consequence of the rise of the individual
in international law that is reflected in these procedural structures. Comparative
institutional analysis reveals that procedural asymmetry is neither unique nor
necessarily, in and of itself, a design defect that indicts the entire investment arbitration
regime.
Comparative analysis may also help either refine or dilute other criticisms of
investment arbitration. For example, critics such as Van Harten often make generalized
critiques that investment disputes are resolved by “arbitrators” not “judges.” 172
Comparative analysis may challenge this explanation because, in the international
arena, the distinction between these two categories is not always clear or important. For
example, although often referred to as “judges,” those serving on the Iran-United States
Claims Tribunal are technically “arbitrators.”173 On various international tribunals, such
as the ICJ and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, State parties are
permitted to appoint “ad hoc judges” to panels hearing their cases.174 The nature and
function of such ad hoc judges is not so different from ad hoc arbitrators. Finally,
arbitrators have presided in numerous important State-to-State disputes that might
otherwise have been submitted to classic public international law courts.175
Many proposed reforms for investment arbitration cited in the introduction are
predicated on skepticism about investment arbitrators and other design features that

169. Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1993).
170. Paula F. Henin, The Jurisdiction of Investment Treaty Tribunals Over Investors' Human Rights
Claims: The Case Against Roussalis v. Romania, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 224, 226 (2012).
171. See id.
172. Van Harten, A Case for an International Investment Court, supra note 23, at 21-32.
173. Susan D. Franck, The Role of International Arbitrators, 12 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 499, 515 n.67
(2006) (citing news reports that refer to members of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunals as both
“arbitrators” and “judges”).
174. See Schwebel, supra note 132.
175. Examples include arbitrations between Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sudan and the Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army, the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission, the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission, and arbitrations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (“UNCLOS”) between Guyana and Suriname and between Barbados and Trinidad and
Tobago. Gary Born, State-to-State Arbitration at the Permanent Court of Arbitration, KLUWER
ARB. BLOG (July 20, 2012), http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/07/20/state-to-statearbitration-at-the-permanent-court-of-arbitration/.
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critics treat as unique to the investment arbitration regime. Comparative analysis with
other international tribunals can help reveal the true strengths or shortcomings of these
critiques. Comparative institutional analysis would also force scholars to locate their
assessment of investment arbitration in a more comprehensive theory of international
adjudication.
To date the only real effort to engage in systematic comparative analysis of the system
design of international tribunals that includes investment tribunals has been Gary
Born’s work identifying a “New Generation” of international tribunals.176 Born argues
that these “Second Generation” tribunals, which include investment arbitration
tribunals, are more frequently used by States, and more likely to render enforceable
outcomes. As a result, he argues, this new generation of tribunals has “important
implications for analysis of international adjudication.”177 They signal that international
adjudication cannot be dismissed (as some critics have posited) as ineffectual, “marginal
and unimportant in contemporary international affairs.”178
The success and effectiveness of this second generation of tribunals, Born claims, has
important implications for system design of future international tribunals.179 The success
of investment arbitration, he argues, challenges what had been settled assumptions
about what makes international tribunals effective. To the extent supportable, this line
of argument suggests that perhaps instead of reforming investment arbitration to look
more like public international tribunals, public international law tribunals have
something to learn from investment arbitration.

C. Integrating Empirical Research with Other Methodologies
One final observation, tied to the prescriptions in Sections III.A. and III.B., is that
empirical research into investment arbitration should be complemented by and tied into
other forms of research. 180 In an articulate statement of the obvious, Beth Simmons
explains, “when we are evaluating our world and the legal institutions that create it,
empirical studies are undeniably important, but they can never tell the whole story.”181
Despite the fact that they cannot tell the whole story, for the reasons described in Part I,
empirical research has the potential to have a profound impact on investment arbitration,
including bolstering or undermining support for proposed reforms. Empirical research
pertaining to national judiciaries or even other international tribunals does not carry with it
the same potential for affecting significant structural reforms. The potential effect of empirical
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See Born, supra note 136, at 775-76.
Id. at 877.
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Id. at 878.
See Shaffer & Ginsburg, supra note 25.
Simmons & Breidenbach, supra note 25, at 219.
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research regarding investment arbitration increases the importance of supplementing such
research with qualitative assessment of institutional features that affect decision-making in
investment arbitration so that any reforms adopted are based on the whole story.

IV. Conclusion
Critics of international investment arbitration focus on the role of investment
arbitrators for good reason. Investment treaties establish skeletal frameworks for the
substance of international investment law and for investment arbitration procedures.
But international arbitrators are the ones putting meat on those bones. That is an
awesome responsibility and exercise of power. That power, in turn, is exercised in a highstakes environment where every issue exists in a tangle of policy disagreement – cases
like Chevron v. Ecuador and Phillip Morris v. Uruguay illustrate that graphically.182 In
this politically charged environment, the power that investment arbitrators exercise
could never be perceived as “a-political.” When critics accuse investment arbitrators of
being political, however, that is not what they mean.
Instead, they are expressing skepticism about whether investment arbitrators can and
do provide neutral, law-bound decisions on investment law disputes. According to some
critics, they do not, but instead make political decisions based on their own policy
preferences or personal interests. The means of appointing investment arbitrators—on an ad
hoc basis and through procedures that involve intentional selection by parties—provides the
intuition for these assumptions. Despite this intuition, however, individualized selection has
some features to commend it in international settings. Most notably, it is a control function
that States have exercised in various other international adjudicatory contexts.
In the debate over the legitimacy of investment arbitration, both sides of the debate
have invoked empirical research in support of their assessment of its procedures and its
outcomes. Empirical research has an important role to play in training focus on
particular questions and providing support for and against particular claims about the
system. As Van Harten acknowledges, however, “there is not, and probably never will be,
conclusive empirical evidence of the presence or absence of systemic bias in investment
arbitration.”183 While this conclusion should not undermine the importance of empirical
research into such possible bias, it should caution against overstating the implications of
any particular study and encourage examining empirical findings in light of research
about other tribunals and other features of international adjudication.

182. Chevron Corp. & Texaco Petroleum Co. v. The Republic of Ecuador, Case No. 2009-23 (Perm.
Ct. Arb. 2009), available at http://www.italaw.com/cases/257; Philip Morris Brand Sarl
(Switz.), Philip Morris Products S.A. (Switz.) and Abal Hermanos S.A. (Uru.) v. Oriental
Republic of Uru., ICSID Case No. ARB/10/7, Objections to Jurisdiction, available at
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet; http://www.italaw.com/cases/460.
183. Van Harten, supra note 43, at 215.
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